ON DEFENDING AN ACCUSED [Are lawyers liars?]

I have been asked for several times, “Aren’t lawyers liars? They defend an accused in court even when they know that the accused committed the crime.” Well, defending an accused is not tantamount to lying. It is a right safeguarded no less than by the fundamental law of the land.  The accuser, the State or the People, has all the resources at its disposal to establish the guilt of the accused. The accused has only his/her lawyer to defend him/her.

I do not say that all the clients whom I represent are innocent. What I say is that his/her innocence is presumed.  No matter what the accused has done, he/she is not legally guilty until a prosecutor offers enough evidence to persuade a judge to render a judgment of conviction. By our legal standard, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required in criminal cases. It means moral certitude.

Not only that. Yes, the accused might have committed the act/s as charged, but it does not end there. We need to make sure that a judgment is in accord with all the attending circumstances and that the appropriate penalty is imposed. What if there is a justifying circumstance, such as self-defense? How about exempting or mitigating circumstances or other circumstances that would affect the criminal liability? Even an incomplete self-defense can lower the penalty by a degree and that matters a lot. It can downgrade a crime from murder to homicide and lower its penalty as what has happened in the recently decided case that I handled. Because of that, my client is now free. A successful defense does not always mean acquittal.

Lawyers are duty-bound to defend their client, regardless of their opinion on their guilt or innocence. Section 20 (i), Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court states that “(i)n defense of a person accused of a crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.” A similar mandate is found under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

On Extrajudicial Confession

The news item says: "With this, La Viña said there is no need to prove Duterte’s remark to the International Criminal Court because there is an admission."  The esteemed Dean made the same remark in the context of impeachment.

But the Supreme Court did say this:

"And according to Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court:

Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction.—An extrajudicial confession made by an The news item says: "With this, La Viña said there is no need to prove Duterte’s remark to the International Criminal Court because there is an admission."

CLEMENTE MAGTOTO, petitioner, vs. HON. MIGUEL M. MANGUERA, Judge of the Court of First Instance (Branch II) of Occidental Mindoro, The PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, IGNACIO CALARA, JR., and LOURDES CALARA, respondents. [G.R. Nos. L-37201-02 March 3, 1975]

With all due respect, Dean La Viña might have been referring to a judicial admission under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, which states:

“SECTION 4. Judicial Admissions.An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.”

But Rule 116 is even explicit in that the prosecution is still required to present evidence, thus:

“Section 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf. (3a)”, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti."

PROCLAMATION NO. 572 DID NOT REVOKE PROCLAMATION NO. 75

On the Amnesty and Revocation
[Stripped of Partisan Considerations]

The factual backdrop:

1) Proclamation No. 572 declared that “[t]he grant of amnesty to former LTSG Antonio Trillanes under Proclamation No. 75 is declared void ab initio because he did not comply with the minimum requirements to qualify under the Amnesty Proclamation.”

2) Proclamation No. 572 further directed the DOJ and AFP Court  Martial to pursue all criminal and administrative cases filed against Sen. Trillanes in relation to the Oakwood Mutiny and the Manila Peninsula Incident.

3) Proclamation No. 572 ordered the AFP and the PNP to employ all lawful means to apprehend Sen. Trillanes so that he can be recommitted to the detention facility where he had been incarcerated for him to stand trial for the crimes he is charged with.

It has been argued that:

1.) Amnesty already granted cannot be revoked because it has already obliterated not only the criminal liability but the crime itself.
2.) The revocation of amnesty, affecting only an individual, violates the Bill of Rights, particularly, the right to the equal protection of the law.
3.) The revocation of the amnesty violates the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, as the President has overstepped into the domain of the courts, and has ignored the required concurrence of the Congress, similar to that when it was granted.
4.) The revocation of the amnesty violates the axiomatic rule on finality of judgments, considering that both the rebellion and coup d’etat cases were already dismissed long time ago.

I offer some points to ponder on:

 That an amnesty obliterates the previous crime or offense committed by the grantee, as if no such crime or offense has been committed.

 That an amnesty issued via a Presidential Proclamation, duly concurred in by Congress, cannot and should not be revoked as it will defeat the purpose of the grant.

 That the act of receiving and processing administratively the applications for amnesty can be delegated by the Chief Executive.

 The contentious issue that the approval of such application is ultimately and exclusively lodged with the President, and the President alone, being an act of State.

 That while a person may have been qualified for such an amnesty, he/she may however refuse to be covered thereby.  Meaning, the issuance of Proclamation No. 75 did not automatically grant amnesty to Sen. Trillanes.

 That Proclamation No. 75 (which granted the amnesty) was issued to cover not an individual but a group of persons; needless to state, it was not issued to grant amnesty to Sen. Trillanes alone.

 The contention that the concurrence of Congress pertained only to the proclamation itself, not to the individual application and approval thereof pursuant to the amnesty proclamation.

 The contention that Proclamation No. 572 was issued not to revoke Proclamation No. 75; as a matter of fact, Proclamation No. 572 was issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 75, even citing the requirements and procedure set therein.

 That trial courts consider not only the issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 572, but also the factual issues of (a) whether or not Sen. Trillanes actually filed his application and (b) whether or not he admitted his guilt.  The court trying his rebellion case already issued an arrest warrant (although he immediately posted bail), while the other court trying his coup d’etat case has set the DOJ’s motion for the reception of evidence on both issues.